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RECOUPMENT PATENT* 
MIRIAM MARCOWITZ-BITTON,** YOTAM KAPLAN*** & MAAYAN PEREL**** 
The patent system aims to encourage innovation while keeping its own 
administrative costs to a minimum. Considering the centrality of innovation to 
twenty-first century economic activity, patent law is widely viewed as a crucial 
element of our legal system. And yet, by any standard, our patent system is 
broken. At present, the United States patent system encourages filing a plethora 
of low-quality patents that have no true innovative value, is plagued by 
opportunistic patent trolls, and produces endless amounts of costly litigation. 
Thus, the patent system stalls, rather than encourages, innovation. 
This Article demonstrates how these phenomena are due to central design flaws 
in the current system. First, although the patent system is designed to encourage 
investment in innovation, it lacks a mechanism for directly examining an 
inventor’s level of investment. This major flaw systematically ignores investment 
in innovation, which is the single most important factor the patent system seeks 
to promote. Second, the current system offers one-size-fits-all protection, 
granting the same twenty-year monopoly to any and all inventions. This 
inflexible legal standard is outdated and inappropriate given the wide variety of 
inventions it addresses and the immense differences between them. 
The core of this Article proposes structural reform designed to remedy these 
fundamental flaws. First, we suggest that the patent system must explicitly 
consider the investment made in each specific invention when deciding what 
level of legal protection each invention merits. Second, we advocate a departure 
from the current one-size-fits-all model in favor of a more tailored approach, 
offering different periods of protection for different inventions. These two 
solutions would produce a system in which inventions are granted protection for 
a duration that depends on the level of investment each invention requires. We 
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call this model a “recoupment patent” and highlight its advantages over the 
current system. 
Under the recoupment patent model, filing for patent protection will require 
documentation of investment in the invention, which will serve as the basis for 
determining duration of protection. Protection will expire once the investment is 
recouped and a fixed percentage of profit is earned. Filing and renewal fees will 
also be calculated based on documented investment. Additionally, investment 
will serve as a basis for calculating royalties (or damages in subsequent 
litigation). Under this proposed regime, the patentee bears the burden of 
demonstrating the level of investment in the invention. This regime is more 
accurately tailored to incentivize innovation while avoiding the excessive 
protection under the current one-size-fits-all system. This new regime also 
incorporates mechanisms to prevent inventors from misstating their investment. 
Throughout the Article, we address the challenges created by our proposed 
recoupment patent model and highlight its advantages over the existing system 
and over other reform proposals. We also discuss extensions and possible 
refinements to the basic conception outlined above. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent law aims to encourage innovation.1 Patent protection grants an 
inventor exclusive rights to use, sell, or license her invention for a limited time 
period of twenty years.2 This provides incentive for investment in innovation 
by allowing the inventor to enjoy the fruits of her labor.3 Yet, the patent system 
has been under fire in the last few decades by critics highlighting its major flaws 
and negative effects on innovation.4 The current system is criticized for being 
overly rigid—offering identical treatment to radically different inventions.5 
This means patent protection is often either too narrow or overbroad. 
Patent protection is too narrow when it offers insufficient incentive for 
inventors to invest in research and development. This problem is especially 
pronounced with pharmaceutical companies, for which the costs of developing 
a new drug are often estimated in the millions.6 When innovation is that costly, 
the standard twenty-year patent protection is often simply not enough for 
inventors to recoup their investment.7 In such cases, the company cannot afford 
to invest, and the public is denied a new and improved medical solution.8 
On the other hand, patents can also be overbroad, granting protection 
when it is not needed.9 In such cases, patent protection can be destructive, 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the enumerated power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).  
 2. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) (explaining that once a patent has been granted, the patent 
owner has the exclusive right to make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import the claimed invention into the 
United States).  
 3. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 168–71 (2005) [hereinafter Cotropia, After-Arising] (discussing how patent 
protection provides patentees an opportunity to invent and have exclusive control over their 
invention); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 129–31 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante] (protecting inventors’ investments in their 
ideas). 
 4. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 2 (2008) (showing that while patents 
provide incentives to invest in research, development, and commercialization, for most businesses 
today, patents fail to provide predictable property rights); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a 
Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 110–11 (2016). 
 5. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 3–5, 136–37 (2009) (showcasing the existence of a patent crisis, where patents calibrated to 
the needs of the pharmaceutical industry are not able to accommodate information technologies, and 
vice versa, and suggesting that courts should make industry-specific inquiries to provide an appropriate 
level of incentive for each industry). 
 6. Id. at 204 n.1. 
 7. Id. at 7–8. 
 8. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 88.  
 9. See Maayan Perel, Reviving the Gatekeeping Function: Optimizing the Exclusion Potential of Subject 
Matter Eligibility, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 237, 242–43 (2013) [hereinafter Perel, Gatekeeping 
Function]. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020) 
484 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
hindering downstream innovation.10 The phenomenon of patent thickets is 
emblematic of this problem.11 Patent thickets are created when different 
inventors make small cumulative contributions to the same product.12 The 
current patent system offers full patent protection for each such fragmental 
contribution to the invention, thus creating a multitude of overlapping patents 
that cover a single product.13 Since a single entity would have extreme difficulty 
collecting licenses from all the patent owners, the existence of patent protection 
can effectively prevent both commercialization and further development of the 
invention.14 In this way, patent protection hinders innovation rather than 
promotes it.15 
The issue of overprotection under the existing patent system is related to 
the more general problem of low patent quality.16 Low patent quality means 
that many patents offer protection for negligible technological developments 
that are close to being obvious or were created with little to no effort.17 Such 
low-quality patents offer owners the same level of protection as do high-quality 
patents, barring nonowners from utilizing many technologies and products. 
This means that the patent system routinely grants patent owners the power to 
interfere with the innovative activity of others, even when these patent owners 
made little to no scientific contribution.18 Low-quality patents thus obstruct 
innovation and progress rather than stimulate them and are generally perceived 
as inventions that do not require patent incentives.19 
Moreover, with low-quality patents, substantial uncertainty attends their 
validity, scope, and enforcement, imposing heavy costs on those who make 
decisions based on patents such as “patentees, prospective licensees, investors,” 
 
 10. See id. at 282–88 (explaining other incentives for invention that could be hindered by patent 
protections).  
 11. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 78.  
 12. Id.  
 13. See id.  
 14. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 
1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 121–22 (2000).  
 15. Id. at 121. 
 16. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2140–
41 (2009) (discussing the problems created by low patent quality). 
 17. See Perel, Gatekeeping Function, supra note 9, at 272–73 (explaining that even when an 
invention appears to lack novelty or be obvious under sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act, there is 
a real problem of retrieving the invalidating prior art necessary to execute a novelty or nonobviousness 
rejection). This problem is bolstered by objective limitations of patent examiners that have only limited 
time to review and apply the prior art. See id.  
 18. Id. at 282–84 (describing such patents as ones that cover inventions whose development is 
not dependent on the Patent Act’s pecuniary incentives). Such patents are unworthy because “they fail 
to reflect an appropriate ‘balance between the ex post costs of short-term monopoly and the benefits of 
higher ex ante incentives to innovate.’” Id. at 282 (quoting The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading 
Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 370, 376–77 (2010)). 
 19. Wagner, supra note 16, at 2138. 
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and others.20 Furthermore, “a low-quality patent system is characterized by a 
large number of errors in the patent-granting process.”21 In addition to 
inappropriate grants, inappropriate denials of patentable inventions can prevent 
the full commercialization of important innovations.22 Finally, low-quality 
patents also impact litigation.23 The uncertainty that surrounds low-quality 
patents increases litigation and promotes more complex and expensive disputes, 
which increases the costs of the entire system.24 It is no surprise that the demand 
to improve patent quality is the centerpiece of many current calls for patent 
reform.25 Scholars have previously suggested that the problem of low-quality 
patents is especially pronounced in the context of business method and software 
patents, and patent quality in these areas is hotly debated.26 To date, discussions 
have yielded many proposals for reform, some of which have been fully or partly 
adopted.27 However, these types of patents still threaten general patent 
quality.28 
Overbroad patent protection is also problematic because it fuels the 
activity of “patent trolls”—entities who abuse patent protection to secure short-
term gains with no relation to innovative activity.29 Patent trolling is associated 
with the generation of income, not through commercialization, but through 
aggressive licensing and litigation of patents by nonpracticing entities 
(“NPEs”).30 Recent empirical work shows that most patent lawsuits are indeed 
asserted by NPEs, suggesting that the problem of patent trolling is yet to be 
solved.31 While encroaching upon the constitutional mandate to “promote the 
 
 20. Id. at 2140. 
 21. Id. at 2141. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2142 (observing the correlation between increased litigation and low-quality patents). 
 24. Id. at 2140–43 (discussing the effects of low-quality patents). 
 25. Id. at 2136. Most efforts and proposals in this context view patent quality as mainly an 
administrative concern. Id. at 2158–61 (discussing the administrative changes on which patent reform 
is focused). Other proposals focus on reforming the prosecution process. Id. at 2162 (describing the 
proposed prosecution-focused patent reform). 
 26. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 187–214 (discussing software and business method 
patents). 
 27. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 100–08 (discussing patent reform initiatives). 
 28. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 21–24 (discussing the problematic nature of software 
patents). 
 29. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities 
Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 242–44 (2017) (discussing different definitions for 
patent trolls); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117, 2117 (2013). 
 30. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 29, at 2163–65 (criticizing lawyers that file patent 
infringement claims against companies). Some scholars have suggested that NPEs may serve a useful 
function in supporting the creation of a market for patent rights. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, 
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 444 (2014). 
 31. Shawn P. Miller et al., Who’s Suing Us? Decoding Patent Plaintiffs Since 2000 with the Stanford 
NPE Litigation Dataset, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 235, 271 (2018). 
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Progress of Science and useful Arts,”32 patent trolls divert investment from 
research and development to potentially unwarranted licensing fees or 
litigation.33 Patent trolling is often facilitated by the granting of low-quality 
patents that cover overly broad claims.34 
Patent trolls assert “overbroad, obvious, or non-novel patents” to force 
alleged infringers to pay licensing fees for a patent that they believe is invalid 
or otherwise face “costly and protracted ligation.”35 
Unfortunately, the current regime tolerates patent trolling.36 Modern 
patent law does not require that inventors “manufacture[], sell, or market their 
writings or ideas” in exchange for patent protection37 but rather affords 
patentees exclusive rights over their inventions without demanding that they 
exploit their inventions to the benefit of the public in return.38 Additionally, it 
does not impose any limitation on the ultimate price of licensing that patent 
owners may demand. The moment a patent is issued, its owner is afforded an 
unlimited right to exploit it for her own narrow financial benefit.39 
 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that authors and inventors have exclusive rights to 
their respective works). 
 33. For an opposite position, suggesting that NPEs have a positive role in serving as efficiency-
enhancing business intermediaries between inventors and commercializers, see generally Ryan T. 
Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2014); 
James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent 
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006); Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2014); and Daniel F. Spulber, Patent Licensing and Bargaining with 
Innovative Complements and Substitutes, 70 RES. ECON. 693, 711 (2016).  
 34. Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality Through Identification of Relevant 
Prior Art: Approaches To Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 
498–99 (2007) (arguing that patent trolling is driven by issuance of poor-quality patents and explaining 
how poor-quality patents containing broad claims are used offensively to obtain licenses or bring 
infringement lawsuits). 
 35. Id. at 498.  
 36. See Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process To Incentivize Innovation in Global 
Economy, 13 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1–2 (2006) (suggesting major amendments to the 
Patent Act in order to make patent laws more favorable to patentees and disadvantageous patent trolls). 
It has been argued that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), which made it more difficult to join defendants in patent 
infringement suits, does not address the problem of patent trolls that Congress had sought to resolve. 
See Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: The Impacts of Recent Judicial Activity on 
Non-Practicing Entities, 12 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2011); Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The 
America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 687–88 (2012). 
 37. White, supra note 36, at 5. 
 38. Id. (noting that manufacture and sale of products are not required under the Patent Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution). Note also that this has not always been the legal practice because throughout 
most of the twentieth century courts were able to limit protection for nonpracticing entities under the 
“paper patent” doctrine. See John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
1359, 1363 (2013) (showing that the abolition of the paper patent doctrine benefited patent trolls and 
was a bane to true innovators). 
 39. White, supra note 36, at 11 (emphasizing that the exclusive rights of patent owners include 
their ability to demand any price for their own benefit). 
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Many scholars have perceived these challenges as a “patent crisis” or 
“patent failure,” insisting on a comprehensive reexamination of the current 
system.40 These challenges introduce significant costs for patentees, innovation, 
and society at large.41 Scholars and policymakers have made numerous attempts 
to introduce different types of reforms to address these challenges.42 Such 
attempts range from providing discretion to courts to tailor protection to 
different technologies on a case-by-case basis,43 to calls for a comprehensive 
legislative reform of the patent system,44 and even more drastic calls to abolish 
the patent system and introduce an alternative regime of prizes and rewards.45 
In this Article, we attribute the failure of the patent system to fundamental 
design flaws in its current structure. First, the patent system does not require 
the patentee to prove that the invention required significant investment, or any 
investment at all for that matter. This undermines investment in innovation, 
which is the primary goal of the patent system.46 Second, our system awards all 
patentees uniformly, once they meet the Patent Act threshold requirements, 
with a twenty-year government sanctioned monopoly over their purported 
invention.47 This one-size-fits-all approach often results in either 
overprotection or underprotection and is inherently unfair because it provides 
the same level of compensation to all patentees without taking into account the 
great differences in levels of investment required by different inventions. 
 
 40. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 235–53 (suggesting a series of reforms to improve the 
notice function of patent law); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3. 
 41. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 46–72, 147–64 (demonstrating how patents fail 
to provide predictable legal boundaries to their owners); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3–6 (arguing 
that the current patent system is in a crisis because it does not incentivize innovation properly); Gerard 
N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1809, 1837 (2007) (“One response is that trolls already impose a tax on innovation . . . .”). 
 42. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 100–08 (concluding that courts might be more effective 
than Congress in achieving some patent reform by tailoring patent law to specific industries through 
different policy levers and common law doctrines). 
 43. Id. at 103–04. 
 44. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 235–52 (discussing legislative reforms to 
improve patent system). 
 45. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 44–45; Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–20 (2003) (advocating for a reward system to complement existing IP 
protection) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Patent Prizes]; Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 899, 939–41 (2002). 
 46. See infra Section II.A (explaining how investment and innovation are tied together in patent 
theory). For economic literature showing a linear relationship between investment and increased 
innovation, see generally Valentina Meliciani, The Relationship Between R&D, Investment and Patents: A 
Panel Data Analysis, 32 APPLIED ECON. 1429 (2000). 
 47. The term of patent rights lasts until twenty years from the date the patent application is filed, 
with special term extensions available if the prosecution of the patent was unreasonably delayed or if 
regulatory approval of a drug consumed a portion of the patent term. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), (b), 155–
156 (2018); Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): A 
Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 754 (2015). 
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We propose to remedy these flaws by introducing a novel regime of 
differential, investment-based patents. Under this new model, the patentee 
must prove the level of investment in each invention, and the duration of the 
patent will depend on that investment. Investment includes any expense 
incurred in the process of research and development of the invention, including 
employee salaries, equipment and materials, lab services, consulting services, 
administrative costs, regulatory costs, commercialization costs, and other costs 
incurred while developing an invention. This will establish a time frame to 
recoup investment and earn some level of profit. Such a regime will tailor the 
protection it offers patentees specifically to match the required economic 
incentive, thus avoiding both underprotection and overprotection. It will 
address the problem of low-quality patents by limiting their duration or 
altogether refusing them protection. This regime will also prevent opportunistic 
behavior by patent trolls, who rely heavily on the ability to acquire cheap, old, 
or low-quality patents.48 
Our proposal offers a structural reform to the patent system that is also a 
natural and fitting legal change. To support the feasibility of our proposal, we 
show that similar regimes designed to allow recoupment of investment in 
innovation have existed in the past. The Patent Act of 1836 established the key 
elements of the patent system as we still know them today49: a patent office,50 
the process of patent application,51 the hiring of professional examiners,52 and a 
library of prior art.53 The 1836 Act also introduced the possibility to extend the 
period of patent protection beyond the term for which it was originally granted 
when inventors were able to prove that the existing patent did not allow them 
“reasonable remuneration” for their expenses and ingenuity.54 This provision 
was later abandoned, mainly for evidentiary reasons and due to its high 
administrative cost.55 As technological advancements have radically cut such 
costs since the nineteenth century, and in light of the current crisis in the patent 
 
 48. Introducing short-term patent protection will reduce patent trolling, as it has been shown that 
patent trolls typically litigate older patents. See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation 
Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1309, 1322–27 (2013) (providing empirical evidence showing that, while product-producing companies 
usually enforce their patents soon after issuance, NPEs begin asserting their patents relatively late in 
the patent term and frequently continue to litigate until expiration). 
 49. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 507–09 (2004); 
Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent Law, 5 Q.J. ECON. 44, 47–48 (1890). 
 50. Smith, supra note 49, at 47. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Max Stul Oppenheimer, Progress or Profit: Reconsidering the Shortened Statutory Period Scheme, 
36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427, 429 n.19 (2018). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 125; see also Smith, supra note 49, at 48. 
 55. Smith, supra note 49, at 49. 
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system, we argue that the time is now ripe for a version of this long-lost 
provision to be reintroduced into the patent system.56 
We advocate for built-in safety valves that will prevent abusive behavior 
by patentees. These include calculating filing and renewal fees based on the 
level of investment documented by the patentee.57 Similarly, licensees’ royalties 
and damages for patent infringement might also be partially calculated based 
on the patentee’s level of investment. The Article also explores the possibility 
of tailoring patent duration according to other metrics besides investment. Such 
alternative routes might be appropriate to offer protection for those rare 
inventions that have great economic value but did not require great investment, 
such as “spark of genius” inventions. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the current model of patent 
protection, exploring the flaws of its one-size-fits-all approach. This part 
demonstrates that the failure of the existing system can be attributed to 
fundamental structural flaws. In particular, the existing system seeks to 
incentivize innovation but never directly observes, verifies, or considers the 
level of investment or ingenuity in such innovation. We demonstrate the 
impracticality of this type of institutional arrangement. Part II introduces the 
proposed differential model: an investment-based patent regime. It discusses 
the characteristics and details of such a regime, proposing safeguards required 
for its operation. This part also explores the mechanisms and institutions that 
can be used to measure and evaluate investment in patents. Part III evaluates 
the merit of the proposed model, comparing its advantages and disadvantages. 
We show that a tailored investment-based patent regime brings the patent 
system closer to a system of rewards and prizes, allowing inventors to recoup 
the investment of their invention while disincentivizing the filing of low-quality 
and valueless patents. Part III thus highlights the advantages of the proposed 
model as a potential solution to the key problems of the current patent system. 
It also discusses some counterarguments and challenges prompted by our 
proposal, mainly addressing the arguably significant administrative costs 
necessary for the operation of our tailored approach. Part IV compares our 
model to other proposals for reform and highlights the advantages of our 
proposal over those alternatives.  
 
 56. See Promoting the Useful Arts: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor Quality Patents?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(statement of Andrew Hirsfeld, Commissioner for Patents USPTO), https:// 
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hirshfeld%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc./F6UQ-
FMT7]; Udi Cohen, Artificial Intelligence Will Help To Solve the USPTO’s Patent Quality Problem, I.P. 
WATCHDOG (Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/11/23/artificial-intelligence-will-
help-solve-usptos-patent-quality-problem/id=116302/ [https://perma.cc/6PUF-B87B]. 
 57. This is contrary to Love’s reform proposal to generally increase the frequency and magnitude 
of maintenance fee payments in the latter half of the patent term. See Love, supra note 48, at 1357. 
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I.  THE EXISTING REGIME AND THE PATENT CRISIS 
Patents are granted to incentivize innovation.58 They provide their owners 
with a reward in the form of a bundle of exclusive rights over their inventions, 
allowing owners exclusive economic benefits.59 Without such protection, 
inventors may have insufficient incentive to invest, fearing they will not be able 
to enjoy the fruits of their labor.60 Patent protection is therefore necessary for 
the advancement of human knowledge, science, and technology.61 Yet, the social 
gain of enhanced innovation comes with a price. To incentivize innovation, 
society grants inventors exclusive ownership of their inventions.62 This results 
in excessively high prices of goods subject to monopolistic patent protection as 
well as consequentially low production.63 Patent law seeks to resolve this cost-
benefit tension by limiting the duration of exclusivity.64 The current system 
applies a one-size-fits-all approach, according the same twenty-year period of 
protection to all inventions irrespective of their value.65 In addition to this time 
limitation, patent law provides statutory and doctrinal safeguards against 
potential imbalances in the costs vis-à-vis benefits of patents, such as specified 
requirements for patentability and the availability of compulsory licensing in 
special circumstances of social need.66 
The current approach to patent protection grants equal potential 
protection to inventions that meet the statutory requirements of subject matter 
eligibility,67 utility,68 novelty,69 and nonobviousness.70 Patentees have similar 
exclusive rights to use, sell, offer for sale, and import patented inventions71 for 
a limited period. Under the current regime, the same duration of patent 
protection applies to all inventions. However, affording all inventors identical 
rights of exclusivity, without taking into account the cost of the invention, 
creates several problems. 
 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 59. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018). 
 60. See Cotropia, After-Arising, supra note 3, at 168–71; Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 3, at 129–30. 
 61. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 8. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 68, 71. 
 64. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). 
 65. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 231, 234 (2014). 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The 
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349–55 (1993) (defining common compulsory license 
agreements). 
 67. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 102. 
 70. Id. § 103. 
 71. Id. § 154(a)(1). 
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First, the current system undermines the constitutional mandate on which 
it is based. Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes 
that “Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”72 But the current 
one-size-fits-all system also protects low-investment inventions, incentivizing 
research and development where they are not needed “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” More specifically, if an invention can be 
created at a low cost, or with virtually no cost at all, no incentive is required in 
order “to promote” it.73 Similarly, as such low-quality inventions typically 
contribute very little to the “Progress of Science,” no constitutional mandate 
exists to incentivize their creation. As one of the authors has argued elsewhere, 
the current system occasionally issues patents whose development is not 
dependent on the Patent Act’s pecuniary incentives.74 
Second, a closely related issue arises from the fact that the current patent 
system grants the same level of protection to both high- and low-quality patents, 
thus failing to balance ex post costs of short-term monopoly and ex ante benefits 
of higher incentives for innovation.75 The decreased competition and increased 
costs associated with patent monopoly thus exceed the societal benefits from 
increased innovation.76 
To appreciate this point, consider the costs imposed by the current system. 
Economic and legal scholarship has established that patents inflict deadweight 
loss on society.77 Patentees enjoy the benefit of selling the rights to their 
inventions at monopolistic prices, which are higher than competitive prices.78 
This prevents the optimum balance between sellers and buyers associated with 
competitive markets. Specifically, users who value the invention at more than 
the competitive price but less than the monopolistic price will forgo transacting 
with the patentee, consequently eliminating the potential profit the patentee 
would have earned were she to sell her invention at a competitive price.79 Such 
 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 73. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 
(2005) (noting that without patent protection, “copiers would be able to appropriate much of the value 
embodied in inventions without incurring the considerable costs of research and development”). 
 74. See Perel, Gatekeeping Function, supra note 9, at 282–88. 
 75. Id. at 282. 
 76. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting 
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 193–94, 196 (2009). 
 77. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 204–05 
(7th ed. 2006). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and 
Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives To Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run 
Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 304 (1998) (illustrating the loss 
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forgone transactions impose a loss on both consumers and producers, 
represented by the combined surplus the parties would have received in a 
competitive market.80 
Under a free competitive regime, lower investment costs associated with 
invention would lower the licensing or sale price of the invention. With optimal 
market conditions of full transparency and low transaction costs, the 
competitive price of a good is reflected in its marginal cost of production.81 In 
a perfect competitive market, a patentee who spent $100 in developing an 
invention would sell her patent for exactly $100 to cover her expenses.82 
However, thanks to the benefit of exclusivity ensured by patent protection, the 
patentee can sell her patent for $100,000, $100,000,000, or even more as long as 
she locates buyers who are willing to pay the monopolistic price. As the rich 
literature on patent holdups and on rent-seeking by patent trolls explains, 
agreeing to pay excessive licensing fees is not a genuine exercise of free will but 
a coerced last resort.83 Since the current one-size-fits-all system of patent 
protection does not align the costs of investment or value of an invention with 
ultimate patent earnings, low-investment inventions impose greater deadweight 
losses on society.84 To illustrate this point, consider two patents that are offered 
for sale at the price of $100,000 each. The investment costs associated with 
developing patent A were $1000, while the investment costs associated with 
developing patent B were $50,000. This means the deadweight loss from the 
low-investment invention A equals $99,000 and is therefore much larger 
compared to the deadweight loss from the high-investment invention B, which 
equals only $50,000. In other words, under competitive market conditions, 
many more people would have been able to buy, use, and enjoy invention A 
(the low-investment invention). 
Of course, costs imposed by the patent system may be justified in order to 
promote innovation. Thus, deadweight loss is unavoidable in monopolistic 
 
production forgo a transaction). In a truly competitive market with optimal conditions, the competitive 
price of a good is reflected in its marginal cost of production. See Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between 
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 80. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 41–42 (2004). 
 81. See Calandrillo, supra note 79, at 304–05; Hall, supra note 79, at 921. 
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product that is based on the patent. The price of such products is determined based on the marginal 
cost of production, regardless of the cost of research and development required for the creation of the 
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 83. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
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markets and might be necessary to ensure the provision of public goods. A so-
called “public good” has two related characteristics: (1) nonrivalry, which means 
that consumption by one person does not leave less for any other consumer, and 
(2) nonexcludability, which is the high cost of excluding nonpaying 
beneficiaries who consume the good.85 Nonexcludability means that the cost of 
barring others from the use of the good is so high that no private profit-
maximizing firm will ultimately be willing to supply it.86 As a result, the 
production of public goods may be insufficient due to the relative ease and low 
costs of use, as compared with production. Rational producers will not expend 
resources to produce public goods in a competitive market when they cannot 
make back the cost of their investment in production.87 Economists refer to this 
as the “public goods problem” and suggest solving it by subsidizing the 
production of underproduced goods.88 Inventions are considered public goods, 
and, therefore, monopoly protection for patent rights is meant to afford 
inventors the opportunity to recoup the fixed cost of invention, namely, the 
initial cost of inventing the goods.89 In this way, our patent system ensures the 
constant “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”90 
Indeed, to justify the grant of patent rights, the monopoly costs entailed 
in the deadweight loss to society must be outweighed by the social benefit of 
increased innovation.91 However, with low-investment inventions, this 
balancing equation seems to collapse.92 When the process of inventing depends 
on relatively low monetary expenses, the inventor is likely to invent regardless 
of the pecuniary incentive embedded in the right to exclude rivals from entering 
the market for her invention.93 With no substantial need to recoup her costs of 
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invention, the inventor will invent so long as the prospective invention is 
anticipated to increase her personal utility.94 
Most importantly, the social costs of patents protecting low-investment 
inventions outweigh the benefits of such patents to society. If the cost of 
creating an invention is low, society achieves only a small gain from the fact 
that the patent system incentivizes an inventor to make this small investment. 
On the other hand, the patent system still forces society to pay a high 
monopolistic price for this small social benefit, assuming there is a demand for 
the product.95 The social benefit does not outweigh a monopolistic price for 
low-cost inventions because society effectively overpays for something it could 
have obtained at a low price in a competitive market. So long as all patents 
receive identical statutory protection, they all generate profits for their owners. 
Society pays for these profits. Yet, the fact that society pays equally to promote 
all inventions, regardless of their respective investments, introduces 
inefficiency. 
To illustrate this problem, consider the following stylized example. 
Assume a manufacturer requires the use of two separate patented inventions in 
order to manufacture its main product. The first invention, owned by Patentee 
A, required a significant investment of $1,000,000. The second invention, 
owned by Patentee B, required an investment of only $1000. Yet, if both 
inventions are necessary to the manufacturer, and assuming no substitutes for 
either are available, the manufacturer will have to buy both at a price that has 
nothing to do with the initial investment required for the creation of each 
invention. Both patentees have the power to bar the manufacturer from 
producing its main product and can thus demand high monopolistic prices for 
the use of their patents. For instance, both patentees can demand a payment of 
$1,000,000 for the manufacturer’s license to use their patents. This means the 
manufacturer’s product will be much more expensive for consumers than it 
might have been if Patentee B was not awarded patent protection. 
This illustration leads to the third problem raised by the current one-size-
fits-all system. It distorts the incentive structure, frequently making 
development of low-investment inventions more profitable for inventors. In 
the example above, it is easy to see how the profits of Patentee B, who invested 
less, will be exponentially greater than those of Patentee A, who invested more 
in his invention. Both are offered the same power vis-à-vis the manufacturer, 
even though Patentee A bore a much greater investment. 
 
 94. See id. at 927–28. 
 95. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 240. This is excluding “pirate” companies that 
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If identical protection and potentially similar earning opportunities 
compensate for smaller and larger investments in research and development 
alike, rational inventors will likely minimize their investment costs and develop 
low-investment inventions.96 This is especially true in light of currently thriving 
patent monetization opportunities. Owners of low-investment patents can 
always hold up inventors downstream to maximize profit or otherwise engage 
in profitable litigation practices.97 At the same time, when enormous 
investments in research and development are required to develop a new 
invention, the current twenty-year protection period may not suffice to 
incentivize inventors.98 This means that potential inventors will often refrain 
from inventing goods and services beneficial to society. This problem is 
especially pronounced in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, where 
firms are often unable to recoup their multibillion dollar research and 
development (“R&D”) investment under the standard twenty-year patent 
protection.99 
Moreover, since the current one-size-fits-all system of patent protection 
does not afford extra points or favorable protection for extensive investments 
in invention, inventors are effectively encouraged to minimize their overall 
research expenses as much as possible, consequently yielding low-quality 
inventions.100 This, in turn, obviously reduces social welfare, as society is 
deprived of the benefit of high-value inventions. However, were patentees 
awarded protection that coincides with their investment, as we propose here, 
inventors would have a greater incentive to engage in complex, expensive, and, 
most importantly, valuable inventive activities. 
The fourth problem arising from the current one-size-fits-all approach 
relates to its vulnerability to abuse by manipulative players in the patent 
ecosystem. Allowing patent owners to obtain licensing revenues highly 
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98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020) 
496 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
exceeding their investment could hamper the ability of downstream innovators 
to fully commercialize the benefit of their knowledge.101 Because all patentees 
enjoy a similar potential to extract unlimited earnings during the twenty years 
of patent duration, they are free to generate income far in excess of their 
investment through injunctive threats and holdups.102 For a defendant who has 
already invested heavily in developing and commercializing her product, which 
allegedly includes an infringing feature, agreeing to excessive royalties is 
probably the most economical way for the defendant to respond.103 Otherwise, 
if the patent is found to be valid and infringed, the injunction will generally be 
effective immediately, forcing the defendant to instantly stop commercializing 
her product.104 By generating income through aggressive licensing and litigation 
instead of commercialization, such patent trolling ultimately hinders 
subsequent innovation at a cost to social welfare. 
Yet, if what patentees were to receive for the technology they create 
reasonably resembled their actual investment, improper injunctive threats and 
strategic holdups could be drastically reduced.105 If, as we suggest here, 
patentees were limited to recouping what they had originally invested, plus a 
fixed percentage of profit, we could restrict their ability to demand excessive 
licensing fees and effectively control their bargaining power. Because the 
investment originally made in the patent would become both transparent (the 
patentee’s declared costs would be made publicly available) and known at the 
time of issuance, prospective licensees could not be pressed to pay extremely 
unreasonable fees for the exploitation of protected inventions.106 
A fifth and closely related problem is the anticommons dynamic prevalent 
in the current system.107 Anticommons refers to the issue of overfragmentation 
of property rights.108 Thus, an anticommons problem is created when too many 
owners hold rights that allow them to exclude others from a given asset.109 In 
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the patent context, this is often the case when several different patents cover 
different elements that must be integrated in order to create one product or if 
different patents cover different steps in a cumulative innovative process.110 
These anticommons easily lead to bargaining breakdowns whenever the 
development of a product requires permission from the owners of two or more 
elements.111 In a more specific example, anticommons theory is highly relevant 
to DNA sequence patents,112 where patentees currently hold hundreds of patents 
on DNA sequences that cover specific genes or fragments of genes.113 Any 
particular use of these patents will likely require the accumulation of many 
patents by one owner leading to anticommons problems.114 In such cases, 
innovation can be impeded if permission from too many patentee right-holders 
is required in order to produce or develop a new product.115 This problem is 
exacerbated under the current one-size-fits-all patent system, as the 
proliferation of multiple low-investment and low-quality patents contributes to 
the creation of anticommons in the patent system. If patent quality is improved, 
and, as we suggest, protection is granted only to patentees that made high 
investments, many anticommons will subsequently disappear. 
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The issue of patent thickets is closely related to the anticommons 
problem.116 Patent thickets can be thought of as an extreme version of the 
anticommons problem, when an accumulation of overlapping patents covers a 
single product in a way that can potentially choke an industry.117 Patent thickets 
are naturally and inevitably created in the current system when different 
inventors make small cumulative contributions to the same product.118 As time 
goes by, it becomes nearly impossible to pierce the patent thicket and secure 
patentee consent, which is necessary for continued innovation.119 Our proposal, 
limiting patent protection for patentees who have made small contributions to 
a product, offers a direct solution to this type of problem. Patent thickets are 
also created when patent offices err in the issuing process, unintentionally 
granting overlapping patents to several inventors.120 In the current patent 
system, such mistakes are a byproduct of the low quality of patents and their 
great number, which overwhelm patent offices. Our proposal, aimed at 
improving patent quality, will therefore also help reduce this type of patent 
thicket. 
II.  THE PROPOSED MODEL 
The following discussion introduces in detail our proposed recoupment-
patent regime as an alternative to the current one-size-fits-all system. Our 
model aims to adhere closely to the economic rationale for intellectual property 
protection in general and patent protection specifically and offers remedies to 
many of the challenges discussed in classical patent theories. 
A. Theoretical Background: The Importance of Investment in Light of Patent 
Theory 
Traditionally, the theoretical justification for the patent regime centers on 
incentives for innovation.121 The current patent system incentivizes innovation 
by providing inventors with a twenty-year period of market exclusivity, thereby 
allowing them to benefit from their investment. This economic rationale for 
patent protection suggests that, in the absence of patent protection, inventors 
cannot prevent others from copying their inventions and that, as a result, others 
can exploit their work for free.122 If inventors cannot benefit fully from their 
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inventions, they will lack sufficient incentive to invest time, effort, and money 
in developing new tools and ideas.123 Our proposal, focusing on the investment 
of patentees in developing their ideas and products, thus easily follows in light 
of the most basic premise of patent law theory. 
Extrapolating from this basic premise, scholars have fine-tuned accounts 
of the intricate connection between patent protection, economic incentive, and 
innovation.124 Kenneth Arrow famously argued for narrow patent protection in 
order to minimize interference with competition and innovation.125 He 
emphasized that patents delay downstream innovation and thus should grant 
patentees as little protection as possible.126 This position stems from Arrow’s 
general view, endorsing competition as the best means to spur innovation.127 
The underlying assumption here is that companies in a competitive marketplace 
will innovate in order to avoid losing out to competitors while monopolists lack 
such incentive. Therefore, Arrow’s argument proposes limited patent 
protection in order to minimize associated monopolies.128 Our proposal 
complements Arrow’s prescriptive argument, as it endorses narrow patents, 
thereby creating short-term instead of long-term monopolies when possible. 
Other economists and legal scholars have offered similar theories focusing 
on cumulative innovation, where a new product is the result of multiple 
improvements to an initial invention.129 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson 
have proposed a model that tries to allocate rights among initial inventors and 
those who develop subsequent improvements.130 Their theory of tailored 
incentives recognizes the importance of intellectual property rights and the 
incentives such rights offer both initial inventors and subsequent contributors 
to the innovation.131 The tailored incentives approach attends more closely to 
the particular allocation of rights to both initial and supplementary inventors.132 
It argues that granting patents to both will normally balance incentives correctly 
but that in some cases the balance should be struck based on the relative 
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importance of the initial invention and subsequent improvement.133 Our 
proposal fits the dictates of their theory, as it allows different levels of 
protection for different patentees based on the levels of investment involved in 
their contributions to the invention as a whole. Thus, in light of the 
complexities introduced by theories of competitive innovation, cumulative 
innovation, anticommons, and patent thickets, basing patent protection on 
investment is worth exploring. 
In his own theoretical writing, Ted Sichelman provides a detailed account 
of the different phases in the development of an invention.134 He emphasizes 
that “[i]nnovation isn’t instant” and “involves numerous steps, many of which 
are fraught with uncertainty and great expense,”135 then identifies several major 
phases in the innovative process.136 The first phase is where the inventor 
identifies a problem that needs to be solved.137 This process can be costly and 
labor intensive.138 The second phase involves the moment of conception and 
development of a working prototype.139 Conception is understood as the 
instance of “formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent 
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in 
practice.”140 Following conception, as long as the inventor files a patent 
application that offers a useful, novel, and nonobvious solution, the invention 
will qualify for patenting.141 “In reality, there is usually no single moment of 
conception but rather a series of steps that refine a potential solution.”142 
Because patent law does not require a working prototype for a patent, a 
 
 133. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 75. 
 134. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–54 (2010); see also 
Emmett W. Eldred & Michael E. McGrath, Commercializing New Technology – I, RES. TECH. MGMT., 
Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 41, 41 (“Promising new technologies are not magically transformed into products; 
they need to be developed to the point where they are ready for commercialization.”). 
 135. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 347–48. 
 136. Id. at 347–54. Note that the innovation process varies across industries and firms within 
industries. For a more sophisticated account of the innovation process, see OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 31–60 (1995), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9539.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2HLW-UN9D].  
 137. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 348–49; see also Stephen J. Kline & Nathan Rosenberg, An 
Overview of Innovation, in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY 275, 289–94, 289 fig.2, 290 fig.3 (Ralph 
Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986) (suggesting that the first stage of innovation is identifying a 
need in a potential market). 
 138. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 348. 
 139. Id. at 349–50. 
 140. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship.”); 
Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72 (2009) 
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of the complete invention.”). 
 141. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). 
 142. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 350.  
98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020) 
2020] RECOUPMENT PATENT 501 
continuum contains the identification of the problem to the building of a 
working prototype upon which the single marker of conception can be placed.143 
Once this phase is complete, usually a patent application can be filed and 
granted.144 The third phase, following the conception and prototype-
development phase, is the stage of transforming a prototype into a commercial 
product.145 In general, a company will undertake significant market testing to 
determine how to build a commercially successful product.146 Often, the capital 
required for the market testing and product commercialization phase is 
substantial.147 However, unlike the risks and costs associated with invention, “a 
patent does not directly protect the information generated during market 
testing and subsequent marketing,”148 creating an ex ante disincentive to engage 
in these activities.149 
Subsequent phases relating to the development of inventions are 
distribution and product improvement.150 Once a sale is made, the product is 
distributed to customers.151 Innovative and patented distribution methods can 
also introduce high costs to patentees who wish to commercialize their 
 
 143. NATHAN ROSENBERG, PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY 192 (1976); Sichelman, supra note 
134, at 350–51; .  
 144. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 350–51 (explaining that this is “because of the reward theory’s 
preference for early patenting and the weak disclosure standards applied by the Patent Office”); see 
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 145. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351–52; see also VIJAY K. JOLLY, COMMERCIALIZING NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 6 (1997); TOM KELLY & JONATHAN LITTMAN, THE ART OF INNOVATION 103–11 
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IDEO and Amazon).  
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 147. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 277 (1977) (“[M]arketing is a major cost in innovation.”). 
 148. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351–52. 
 149. Id.; see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 339 (2008) (recognizing that a potential deficiency of patent 
law is its failure to protect “market experimentation” directly); Kitch, supra note 147, at 276–77 (noting 
that investments in development of the invention “can be large and produce information . . . that would 
be appropriable by competitors absent the original patent”); cf. Mohanbir Sawhney et al., The 12 
Different Ways for Companies To Innovate, 47 M.I.T. SLOAN MGMT. REV. 75, 75–76, 81 (2006) (noting 
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 150. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 352–54; see also Kline & Rosenberg, supra note 137, at 289 
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inventions.152 Furthermore, soon after a product is launched, the company 
selling the product or some different entity may develop an improvement of 
the invention.153 Under patent law, these improved products often fall under 
the scope of the patent covering the original product as well as qualifying for 
separate patent protection.154 If a party independent of the original patentee 
creates the patentable improvement, the problem of “blocking patents” arises.155 
The second patent holder is blocked from making and selling the improved 
product by the first patent, and the first patent holder is blocked from doing 
the same by the second patent.156 If the transaction costs of conducting the deal 
are lower than the benefit of the improvement, the two patent holders would 
presumably “come to an agreement and share the profits.”157 However, “if 
transaction costs are high, the improvement may never be developed.”158 This 
in turn may add additional costs to the development and commercialization of 
inventions. 
Sichelman’s description of the different stages of innovation ties into our 
argument in two important ways. First, it highlights the fact that a single 
process or product may require multiple stages of development and therefore a 
multiplicity of patents. If patent protection should depend on the level of 
investment, this can help solve the problems of patent thickets and patent 
anticommons that often result from this multiplicity. Second, Sichelman’s 
description emphasizes the many types of costs that inventors face, thereby 
stressing the need to consider such investments seriously as part of the process 
of patent application and issuance. Our proposed model suggests that all the 
types of investment listed by Sichelman should be considered in determining 
appropriate patent duration. 
Edmund Kitch offers an alternative theory to patent protection that 
focuses on the ex post benefits of patent protection.159 In his view, absent patent 
protection, an invention has no owner, and thus no one has an incentive to 
 
 152. Id. at 353; see also Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1034 (2004). 
 153. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353; see also JOLLY, supra note 145, at 12. 
 154. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 860–61. 
 155. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994); Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 860–62 (explaining the 
phenomenon of blocking patents). 
 156. Merges, supra note 155, at 80; Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353. 
 157. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353; see also Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent 
Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 871–72 (2007). 
 158. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 354; see also Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 157, at 872 (“On 
the margin, the higher fees may not leave enough profits to justify the investment in the innovation.”). 
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98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020) 
2020] RECOUPMENT PATENT 503 
invest in developing it further.160 This is a classic “tragedy of the commons” or 
anticommons situation, as the common property or ownerless asset (in this case 
the invention) is not optimally managed.161 “Kitch’s prospect theory strongly 
emphasizes the role of a single patentee in coordinating the development, 
implementation, and improvement of an invention.”162 By granting ownership 
to the patentee, patents encourage downstream investment and innovation after 
a patent is granted. This account differs from traditional economic theory of 
patent law, as it suggests that patent monopoly is an advantage instead of a 
disadvantage, and focuses on encouraging investment ex post, after a patent was 
granted, rather than ex ante, before the patent is granted.163 Our proposal offers 
benefits according to this theoretical perspective as well, despite the fact that 
Kitch’s theory is markedly different from other accounts described above and is 
therefore highly controversial. As we demonstrate below, our proposal includes 
mechanisms that allow consideration of investments occurring after the patent 
is granted and can thus also offer advantages under Kitch’s ex post theory of 
patent law while not providing the patentee prohibitively strong monopoly 
power. 
B. Investment-Based Patent 
The starting point for our analysis is the undisputedly low quality of 
patents in the existing system. Currently, estimates suggest that only around 
10% of patents issued in the United States are of high economic value.164 These 
estimates are based on renewal fee data.165 Renewal at the twelve-year mark is 
another indicator of high-value patents.166 In the United States, patents are 
eligible for renewal during years three, seven, and eleven from the date of 
issue.167 Current data suggest that only about 40% of issued patents are renewed 
in the last period.168 Many of those renewed patents are renewed for cross-
licensing purposes.169 Thus, low-value inventions account for the great majority 
of issued patents.170 
 
 160. Id. at 276–77; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and 
Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 473 (1992): Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, 
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 161. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 69–72. 
 162. Id. at 71. 
 163. Id. at 69. 
 164. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 100 (reviewing empirical data pertaining to U.S. 
patent value and showing that “the majority of patents are not worth more than a few thousand 
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 165. Id. at 99–100. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 99. 
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To solve these problems, we suggest that some deeper form of inquiry into 
patent quality is needed at the stage of patent application. Thus, under our 
proposed investment-based regime, patentees will continue filing for patents as 
they currently do. However, instead of receiving a fixed, twenty-year protection 
period, a patentee will be granted a protection period that will enable her to 
recoup her declared investment, as supported by evidence, plus an additional 
fixed percentage of profit. The applicant will be obliged to file investment 
recoupment reports upon renewals to ensure protection until she fully recoups 
her investment and additional fixed profits. For example, a pharmaceutical 
company will be able to file for its investment in developing a specific drug, 
recouping its high development costs, which can be as high as 2.4 billion dollars 
per drug, including failed attempts at development, which are currently not 
fully subsidized.171 This will make the existing regimes for the extension of 
pharmaceutical patents, which are clumsy and complex due to regulatory 
approval delays, redundant and unnecessary.172 Such a tailored regime will allow 
the company to recoup its investment while profiting, thus incentivizing 
companies to undertake the high costs involved in drug development. 
Conversely, a company engaged in developing computer software will be able 
to recoup its investment without receiving an excessive twenty-year term of 
protection unnecessary to recoup its presumably lower investment.173 
While the patent applicant will have to document the actual and 
anticipated investment both in advance and upon filing for the patent, her 
investment can be updated during the lifetime of the patent to reflect the 
patentee’s actual investment. This feature of the model is critical because patent 
applications are usually filed at an early phase in the life of the invention174 in 
order to preempt others under the first-to-file patent regime. 
We propose that payment of filing and renewal fees be deferred to a point 
in time when the patentee actually makes an income, rather than being due 
immediately upon filing when the patentee does not necessarily have any 
income. Such an approach allows all patentees, especially entrepreneurial 
entities such as small startup companies with very little income, time to develop 
 
 171. It is estimated that the total time spent from the beginning of a research project to the 
marketing of a successful drug is twelve to fifteen years, 1.8 years of which is due to the FDA approval 
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MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 258 (2012). 
 172. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3–4, 136–37. 
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income sources that will allow them to pay the relatively high fees in turn. 
However, some basic fees will be paid upon filing in order to sponsor the patent 
prosecution process within the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”).175 
Our proposal is centered on the U.S. market. However, it may be applied 
internationally and is in line with current regional and international trends 
calling for regional and global patent protection.176 For example, the European 
Patent Office (“EPO”) offers a regional scheme for patent protection for the 
Contracting States to the European Patent Convention.177 The major advantage 
of this scheme is that the EPO provides a single patent grant procedure. 
Therefore, the patents granted are not European Union patents or even Europe-
wide patents but a bundle of national patents that need to be separately enforced 
at the national level. If our model is applied internationally, it should be 
uniform and introduce a unitary reporting scheme for investment recoupment. 
Importantly, our proposal is aimed at offering tailored incentives. Therefore, if 
applied internationally, recoupment should be measured internationally. This 
means that if a patentee manages to recoup her investment, plus the designated 
level of profits in a certain country, she will not be able to apply for a patent 
elsewhere. If a patentee applies simultaneously for patent protection in many 
countries, she can recoup her investment from all of them; all patents will expire 
once she recoups her investment and profits. Such international investment 
recoupment has clear advantages over domestic recoupment. First, this means 
that in many cases it will not be worthwhile for patentees to file in multiple 
jurisdictions, thus saving significant administrative costs. Second, to maximize 
profits, most patentees will elect to recoup their investment in developed 
economies; this means that inventions will typically fall into the public domain 
much earlier in developing countries, thus resulting in distributional advantages 
and cheaper access to inventions.178 
 
 175. USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-
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 176. See generally Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52 IDEA 197, 199–200 
(2012) (introducing a global patent while suggesting abolishing national patent protection regimes); 
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texts/epc.html [https://perma.cc/2XV6-VBG9] (describing the European Patent Office’s period of 
implementation including the goal of centralization).  
 177. See European Patent Guide: How To Get a European Patent, EUR. PAT. OFF., 
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More generally, our proposal seeks to create a more balanced transaction 
between the inventor and the public.179 The traditional one-size-fits-all deal is 
inherently unfair to both high-investment patentees and the public. High-
investment patentees do not always get their fair share of the value of their 
inventions, and downstream inventors are often required to pay high prices for 
inventions even if they are of low quality and low investment. Our proposed 
regime introduces greater fairness regarding the patentee’s reward and incentive 
structures. 
Under such a regime, we believe patent quality will greatly improve. This 
change will resolve, or at least minimize, many of the existing challenges within 
the patent system. Patent quality will improve as fewer low-investment patents 
are filed. Additionally, the phenomenon of patent trolls might disappear or be 
minimized under such conditions because such patent holders will not be able 
to establish high investment for their inventions. Moreover, such a regime 
offers important information about the costs incurred in developing the 
invention. Such information affords important data for licensing and litigation 
purposes and can greatly prevent high licensing and litigation costs, therefore 
reducing information costs and transaction costs pertaining to patents filed 
under such a regime. 
This approach also incentivizes patentees to commercialize inventions and 
bring them to market.180 When a patentee knows that she can recoup her 
investment, she will have greater incentive to move forward with 
commercializing her invention. If we allow patentees to update their investment 
during the life of the patent application or the issued patent, we will see more 
commercialization compared to current commercialization rates, which are very 
low.181 
C. Risks and Safeguards 
The model we propose will be accompanied by various safeguards 
designed to prevent abuse, such as falsification or useless spending. Under this 
regime, companies would arguably be incentivized to report higher investment 
so that they can recoup higher returns. In order to address this concern, the 
following safety valves will be introduced: first, application and renewal fees 
will be keyed to the declared investment. Patentees will thus be required to pay 
 
 179. Patent protection is perceived as a second-best bargain between the public and the inventor, 
where the inventor provides the public with a disclosure of the invention in return for exclusivity for 
a limited time. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 66 (discussing the secondary utilitarian justification 
for patent law, which is encouraging the disclosure of inventions that might otherwise be kept secret). 
 180. See generally Sichelman, supra note 134, at 341 (discussing the low rates of patent 
commercialization and proposing a new commercialization patent, granted in exchange for the 
commitment to make and sell a substantially novel product). 
 181. Id. at 343–47. 
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application and renewal fees that stand in relation to the level of protection they 
claim. To prevent abuse, fees will be calibrated to the level of investment. This 
flexible method for calculating filing and renewal fees will disincentivize flawed 
reporting. Furthermore, to the extent that several patent filings originate from 
the same research investment, the total investment will be divided in accordance 
with the number of filings, and each patentee will declare an equal portion of 
the total investment. Second, upon litigation and licensing of the patent, a 
patentee will bear the burden of proof to establish the level of investment, which 
will be the basis for calculating both damages and royalties.182 Such a burden 
will also contribute to the disincentivizing of flawed reporting. Additionally, 
beyond these two major safeguards, many existing schemes guarantee honest 
reporting of investment. For example, state and federal income tax filings,183 
SEC filings,184 publicly traded companies’ regulatory reporting schemes,185 
private companies’ by-laws and reporting requirements,186 etc., will impede false 
reporting. If a patentee knows that different reporting schemes will verify her 
statements, she will hesitate to abuse the system. This is especially valuable 
when looking at very high investment patents such as pharmaceutical patents. 
Most pharmaceutical companies and major technology companies are publicly 
traded187 so false reporting is not a real concern, especially given these additional 
oversight tools. 
The risk of false reporting may be aggravated in the case of global 
corporations because such corporations can attribute greater investment to a 
certain patent or attribute a certain investment to a few patent applications, 
especially if a recoupment model is adopted internationally. Similar reporting 
challenges came up in the context of the international taxation of global 
corporations with regard to transfer prices.188 These challenges have been 
addressed by introducing a unified reporting scheme, which is workable and has 
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proven to be successful.189 If our recoupment regime is adopted internationally 
or by a large number of countries, a unified reporting scheme can be introduced 
and offer yet another safeguard against misstatements of investment. 
Another question that must be addressed pertains to the precise definition 
of “investment.” The proposed regime must be based on a clear understanding 
of what constitutes investment and why we should employ it as a measure to fix 
the term for patent protection. For our purposes, investment includes any 
expense incurred in the process of research and development of the invention, 
which has been described in greater detail above.190 Such expenses can differ 
greatly based on the type of the technology and can vary significantly among 
different patenting entities (corporations, individuals, etc.). Research and 
development costs, as well as any other costs involved in inventing, should be 
taken into account. Such costs may include employee salaries, equipment and 
materials, lab services, consulting services, administrative costs, regulatory 
costs, commercialization costs, and other costs incurred while developing an 
invention. Investment serves as a good basis for determining recoupment and a 
generally good way to protect inventors because it is probably the only 
measurable variable directly relating to the invention.191 Investment is also very 
responsive to the basic economic rationale for justifying patent protection. This 
suggests that if patentees are afforded the ability to recoup their investment, 
invention will take place with proper economic incentives. 
Allowing recoupment of investment might incentivize inefficient 
investment in research and development because patentees know they can 
recoup their incurred investment regardless of their efficiency. Moreover, there 
may be some concern that a recoupment regime will incentivize patentees to 
slow down product sales in order to extend the duration of recoupment and, as 
a result, the duration of the patent monopoly. These two concerns are not 
significant because patentees have a natural incentive to recoup their 
investment and profit as quickly as possible, especially in light of possible 
market competition. Therefore, there is little risk that they will try to slow the 
recoupment process. Moreover, in most cases, patentees cannot really control 
the success of their products, their respective sales, and the pace of sales.192 
Lastly, patentees will generally try to economize their costs and not overinvest 
in research and development, especially when they have limited knowledge 
 
 189. See id. at 156–58.  
 190. See supra Section II.A. 
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regarding future income from the sales of their invention, or when they face 
pressure from competitors in the race to be the first to patent the invention. 
Another possible concern is that introducing this new patent regime might 
incentivize inventors to rely on trade secrecy and avoid patent protection 
altogether. The proposed model might thereby undermine the goal of 
encouraging the disclosure of inventions that might otherwise be kept secret. 
These concerns are unrealistic, and it is unlikely that the proposed model will 
change existing incentives to rely on trade secrecy and patents because the 
decision on which protection scheme to utilize is complex and depends on many 
considerations.193 When applicants can safely rely on trade secrecy, they will not 
file a patent application, regardless of the specifics of the patent regime in 
place.194 Conversely, when applicants cannot maintain secrecy, they will have to 
apply for a patent.195 The proposed model offers a more tailored and fair regime 
to all patentees and removes the distortion created by the one-size-fits-all 
regime. If an invention is the fruit of significant labor, the applicant will have 
incentives in place to apply for patent protection in order to recoup her 
investment. Additionally, very few scientists obtain technical knowledge from 
patents, and scientists at many companies are actually discouraged from reading 
patents.196 Therefore, the informational value of patent documents is less 
significant than one might imagine it to be. 
D. Spark-of-Genius Inventions and Value-Based Patents 
A possible objection to our investment-based approach is that inventions 
might be the product of accidental innovation, spark of genius, or other actions 
that do not necessarily reflect high investment of resources. However, this 
objection is overstated. First, it is currently estimated that only a very small 
fraction of inventions, around 0.5%, represent spark-of-genius inventions that 
reflect both low investment and high value.197 In some sectors, such as business 
methods or information technologies, this estimate is probably 1% of issued 
patents.198 Second, even if an invention supposedly represents a spark of genius, 
it might still be priced highly when one estimates the actual dollar investment 
required to create it. For example, if a gifted employee comes up with an 
invention that is of great economic value by a spark of genius, we may assume 
that this employee’s costs would reflect her innovative capabilities. 
 
 193. See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 751, 754–70, 797–801 (2018) (discussing the multitude of considerations that drive startups to 
use trade secrecy). 
 194. Id. at 810. 
 195. Id. at 770–73. 
 196. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 66. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id.  
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Additionally, we can adopt a flexible measure to assess the investment in such 
rare cases by including employee education, training, and other contributions 
in the investment that can be recouped because capacity to innovate stems from 
a large set of factors. Third, even if spark-of-genius inventions do exist, it does 
not follow that they merit increased patent protection. In fact, if such inventions 
do not require investment, there is no need to incentivize them, so the principal 
rationale for patent protection is missing. Thus, the mere fact that an accidental 
invention contributed to society does not mean the inventor is entitled to this 
accidental benefit at the expense of all others. 
Nevertheless, to reflect the contribution of these inventors to society, one 
might still wish to reward spark-of-genius inventors regardless of the need to 
incentivize investment. We show that this can be done, using some of the 
valuation methods described below, which are designed to estimate the value of 
an invention rather than the investment required to create it. Under such a 
regime, patentees might have a choice between an investment-based route, as 
described above, or a value-based route. Under the value-based route, the 
economic value of an invention (as opposed to its investment) will be assessed 
at the time of patent application, and the protection period will be determined 
according to this value. The patentee will have to pay a fixed fee for the 
valuation of her invention. This approach offers the inventor a fair reward for 
the economic value of her invention at the time of issuance. Similar to the model 
proposed above regarding an investment-based approach, such a scheme should 
also include built-in safety valves, such as filing and renewal fees, which are 
keyed to the economic value of the invention. Under such a two-tier system, 
which offers two routes for patent protection—investment-based and value-






Patent Filing Route 
High High Either investment-based or value-based filing, 
whichever is higher 
High Low Value-based filing 
Low Low Probably no filing 
Low High Investment-based filing or no filing 
 
This two-tier regime provides incentive to file for patent protection if the 
patent required high investment, is of high economic value, or both. However, 
while we show that such a regime is possible, we do not advocate its use. As we 
show below, the value of an invention (as opposed to the investment required 
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to create it) is costlier to measure.199 Therefore, a value-based patent regime for 
tailoring patent protection will come at unnecessarily high administrative costs 
and is inadvisable. Additionally, the incentive structure created under such a 
regime is distorted in allowing the continued filing of low-investment patents. 
As we explain above, there is no need to use the patent system to incentivize 
inventions that required very low investment. 
E. Existing Patent Valuation Methods 
This section discusses the valuation component of our proposal and 
describes a list of methods currently used to quantify the worth of patents and 
inventions in monetary terms.200 These methods, which adopt a positive 
economic perspective,201 are primarily used for licensing purposes.202 
Theoretically, any of the different economic measures listed below, which 
determine the worth of specific inventions, can be used to tailor the duration of 
patent protection. In this section, we review these possible economic measures, 
including rules of thumb, the market method, competitive advantage valuation, 
discounted cash flow method, option pricing, and investment in the invention. 
We argue that, while these methods are all possible, the measure of investment 
in developing the invention is the preferable route for keying patent duration. 
The reason for this is that investment is relatively easy to measure, compared 
to other financial metrics and is also the most important factor to consider in 
light of the goals of the patent system. 
1.  Rules of Thumb 
“Rules of thumb” are often used to price patents for purposes of licensing, 
especially for royalty rate payments.203 In particular, when the parties are 
uncertain about whether the invention can be profitably exploited, it makes 
sense for them to “agree to enter into a profit-sharing license rather than fix a 
 
 199. See infra notes 241–48 and accompanying text. 
 200. Josh Lerner & Anne Layne-Farrar, Valuing Patents for Licensing: A Practical Survey of the 
Literature 2–7 (Mar. 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) 
(examining when industry assumptions drive firms to license and how patents are ultimately licensed 
while noting myriad ways of payment for value of patents). 
 201. Richard S. Toikka, Patent Licensing Under Competitive and Non-Competitive Conditions, 82 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279, 279–80 (2000) (describing the impact of competitive markets 
on licensee’s profits and overall patent value). 
 202. See Anna Boman & Jonas Larsson, Patent Valuation in Theory and Practice, EKONOMISKA 
INSTITUTIONEN 1, 42–45 (2003) (discussing crucial factors affecting current valuation methods and 
noting various factors that affect licensing value). 
 203. See Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 7 (describing industry practices for pricing 
patents). 
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price for the patent and engage in a sales transaction.”204 Generally, patent 
holders receive 5% of sales revenues or 25% of operation profit margins.205 
Another frequently used rule calls for a 25%/75% split of profits.206 These rules 
of thumb provide a one-size-fits-all approach that is simple and easy to apply.207 
On the other hand, they ignore the specific characteristics of the patent being 
licensed.208 As such, this method of valuation applies a rule of profit sharing 
irrespective of the underlying patent’s quality or potential to promote follow-
on innovation.209 As a result, such an approach cannot be the default valuation 
method for our tailored protection regime because it does not provide a specific 
price tag and fails to offer a valuation of the specific patent. 
2.  The Market Method 
The valuation of an asset is commonly established via an estimate of its 
price or the amount paid for it in a market exchange.210 The market method is a 
comparative pricing approach according to which “the best metric for 
determining the worth of a patent is the range of prices garnered in the sale of 
similar technologies.”211 Theoretically, this method may be more considerate of 
the potential economic benefit of the specific patent.212 However, the market 
method assumes a positive economic point of view213 and does not always 
account for the patent’s quality compared to similar technologies.214 
 
 204. See F. Russel Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex 
Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2003) (noting techniques parties can use 
when there is uncertainty about an invention’s profitability). 
 205. Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-
Patent Products, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 763, 778 (2011) (noting a common 
rule used for valuing licensed patents). 
 206. See LAUREN JOHNSTON STIROH & RICHARD T. RAPP, MODERN METHODS FOR THE 
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6–7 (1998), https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/ 
publications/archive1/3864.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMX7-U2CL] (describing general formulas for 
profit splitting).  
 207. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 7 (describing a one-size-fits-all approach to patent 
valuation). 
 208. Id. (noting the drawbacks of using the rule of thumb for patent valuation). 
 209. Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1190 (discussing the drawback of valuation based on profit 
sharing regardless of patent quality). 
 210. Ted Hagelin, Competitive Advantage Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: A New Tool for IP 
Managers, 44 IDEA 79, 80 (2003) (“The valuation of an asset is an estimation of its price. The price of 
an asset is the amount paid for an asset in a market exchange.”). 
 211. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 8. 
 212. Russell L. Parr & Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing Intellectual Property, in 
THE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 39, 55–58 
(Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer eds., 1994) (analyzing the benefits of the use of the market 
method when valuing patents). 
 213. Id. at 58 (explaining the assumption that best efforts are used to expand application of 
intellectual property). 
 214. Id. (showing how uniqueness of certain patents makes using the market approach more 
difficult). 
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3.  Competitive Advantage Valuation (“CAV”) 
A patent provides an exclusive right of limited duration over a new, 
nonobvious invention, where the right to sue others for infringement is granted 
in return for publication of the invention.215 Therefore, “the direct financial 
value of a patent or patent application per se, must be the value of the potential 
extra profits obtainable from fully exploiting the invention defined by the 
patent’s claims in the patent’s presence compared with those obtainable without 
patent protection.”216 Accordingly, the major premise of the CAV method is 
that the value of an intellectual property asset should be derived entirely from 
the value of the product, process, or service that utilizes it.217 The CAV method 
assumes that the value of such an asset can be best measured by the competitive 
advantage that it contributes to a product, process, or service.218 This 
competitive advantage is defined as the advantages or disadvantages of an asset 
in comparison to an average substitute intellectual property asset.219 While this 
model is based on a logical association of variables and utilizes simple input 
values,220 it necessarily requires a significant degree of speculation. The main 
variables in the CAV method are the net present value of the product, process, 
or service incorporating the intellectual property asset and the competitive 
advantage contribution of the asset to the net present value.221 
4.  The Discounted Cash Flow Method 
The discounted cash flow method relies on the same kinds of calculations 
that financiers employ in ascribing value to other kinds of investment 
opportunities.222 In particular, this method determines that the price of a patent 
can be expressed as the present value of the future stream of economic benefits 
derived from ownership.223 Regardless of this method’s accuracy, it is a purely 
economic method of valuation that includes “projected sales of products based 
 
 215. Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation Methods with 
Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for Further Research 2 (Judge Inst., Working Paper 
No. 21/97, 1997).  
 216. Id. 
 217. Hagelin, supra note 210, at 81 (describing the general principles of the competitive advantage 
valuation method). 
 218. Id. at 81–82 (identifying competitive advantage as the main contributing factor to the value 
of an intellectual property asset). 
 219. Id. at 82 (defining competitive advantage contribution as the difference between a given asset 
and an average replacement). 
 220. See id. at 112–13 (concluding that CAV can be used in multiple valuation contexts). 
 221. Id. at 82 (describing the key variables in the CAV method). 
 222. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 10 (describing the discounted cash flow method). 
 223. Id. (describing how a patent price is expressed under the discount cash flow method). 
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on the patent over its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared 
to competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.”224 
5.  The Option Pricing Method 
Another type of valuation method described in the literature is based on 
option valuation formulas,225 which were primarily developed for use in pricing 
financial options.226 These methods were found also applicable to patents due 
to the many similarities between these two types of assets.227 Both patents and 
financial options establish a future right to exploit an asset and exclude others 
from it.228 The owner of a stock option has a right to obtain “an exclusive . . . 
equity interest in the underlying firm.”229 Similarly, the owner of a patent has 
“the right to exclude others from using the underlying invention, and further 
investment is required to exploit its commercial potential.”230 Additionally, 
financial options and patents are rights of limited duration: patents are limited 
by their expiration dates, and options are limited by their exercise dates.231 
Furthermore, both patents and financial options are directly linked to an 
underlying asset—an innovation or a firm, respectively—and both can be used 
to leverage or hedge against variance in prices.232 Lastly, similar valuation 
challenges exist with regard to both assets in that both offer potential future 
earnings that cannot be priced accurately without making a complex series of 
economic predictions.233 
In 1973, Myron Scholes and Fischer Black published their option valuation 
formula, which offered for the first time exact and prompt option pricing 
solutions.234 Options on an underlying asset can be valued, according to Scholes 
and Black, if information exists regarding different items: the current price of 
the asset, the exercise price of the option, the expiration date of the option, the 
standard deviation of the underlying asset returns, and the risk-free interest rate 
 
 224. Id. (describing the challenge of separating purely economic value from other factors affecting 
sales and profitability). 
 225. See generally Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European 
Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1986) (developing a model that allows recovering the 
distribution returns from holding patents at each age over the lifespan of patents from information on 
patent renewals to enable value calculations). 
 226. See Pitkethly, supra note 215, at 10 (indicating the primary function of option pricing). 
 227. See Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1185 (referring to the usefulness of the market 
valuation method for patent valuation). 
 228. Id. at 1194 (stating that stock options and patents represent future rights to exploit and 
exclude). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. (comparing stock options to patents in relation to the underlying assets). 
 233. Id. (providing examples for valuation difficulty for patents and options). 
 234. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. 
ECON. 637, 640–53 (1973) (introducing a formula for pricing an option). 
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and distribution function for the asset price.235 Option pricing methods “account 
for total risk, including the impact of uncertainty on the value of the patent,” 
while providing “managers with more flexibility in evaluating the strategic 
possibilities entailed in licensing” a patent.236 Yet, scholars also highlight some 
of this method’s shortcomings.237 
6.  Patent Investment 
Patent investment is currently measured under the cost method for patent 
valuation. The cost method approach for valuing patents simply calculates the 
cost of developing and patenting the invention in question.238 Currently, this 
method considers only historic costs of acquisition while ignoring future 
benefits that may accrue from the patent and influence its value.239 While it 
does consider one important indicator of patent quality—the cost of developing 
the underlying invention—it does so from a positive economic perspective.240 
We argue that the cost method is the preferable approach for the investment-
based route described in this Article. However, under our regime the patentee 
should be able to recoup more than historic costs of acquisition, and the cost 
method will be adjusted to include any expense incurred in creating the 
invention. 
Measuring patent investment using the cost method is preferable to other 
methods described above that attempt to capture the benefit produced from the 
invention, rather than its cost. In particular, while the cost method utilizes 
information regarding out-of-pocket expenses (in all stages of the work on the 
invention), the methods described above, focusing on the benefit of the patent 
(rather than its cost), necessitate some speculation regarding future earnings or 
comparative advantage of the invention resulting from its use. Thus, true 
estimation of the value of any asset, as opposed to the investment required to 
create it, is of necessity an uncertain prediction.241 This is especially true 
 
 235. See Pitkethly, supra note 215, at 12 (highlighting the advantages of the Black and Scholes 
approach). 
 236. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 12. 
 237. Id. at 11–12 (suggesting that one of the shortcomings of the option-pricing method is lack of 
appropriate inputs). For example, it can be argued that option-pricing methods do not account for the 
normative question of how to valuate the patent based on its quality. See id. 
 238. Id. at 8 (discussing the method of valuing patents based on the cost method). 
 239. Pitkethly, supra note 215, at 6 (explaining the drawbacks of the cost method of patent 
valuation). 
 240. It should be noted that patent valuation can be manipulated in different ways, affecting overall 
patent quality. Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1183 (recognizing the cost method’s limitations 
when valuing a patent). 
 241. Hagelin, supra note 210, at 80 (explaining the correlation between the estimated patent value 
and actual prices). 
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regarding the value of intellectual property assets.242 Indeed, predicting the 
value of intellectual property assets is especially indeterminate for a few major 
reasons.243 First, established markets for the exchange of intellectual property 
assets do not yet exist.244 Second, intellectual property assets are rarely 
comparable.245 Third, the terms and conditions of intellectual property 
exchanges vary widely, and the details of such exchanges, especially prices, are 
rarely available to the public.246 Fourth, there exists a “multiplicity of factors 
that affect patents’ value over time.”247 Thus, establishing an accurate model of 
patent valuation is rather elusive.248 Therefore, while possible to use, valuation 
methods not based on investment are significantly costlier and introduce 
additional uncertainty. While such methods can be used to assess the value of 
the patent upon approval and issuance, we believe their use will overburden 
applicants and officials alike. The cost method described here, or some variation 
of it, is therefore the best approach for keying patent duration in terms of 
administrative costs and realization of the goals of the patent system. 
F. Regulating the Process of Patent Valuation 
Under our proposed model, when a patent is approved, it will undergo a 
valuation process to determine its level of investment. Such determinations will 
provide a tool to assess patent duration. Rather than fixing a one-size-fits-all 
term of twenty years from filing, under this regime the duration of the patent 
will be determined based on the period of time needed to recoup patentee 
investment, plus a predetermined percentage of profit. The patentee and the 
valuation agency will assess how much time is needed given the declared 
investment. It is important to note that providing an estimate regarding the 
duration of each patent upfront is needed so that the innovative community has 
a clear sense regarding the expiration dates of such patents as well as when they 
will enter the public domain, which is the engine for future innovation.249 Our 
proposal suggests nominating a regulating body that would tag each issued 
patent with an appropriate protection period according to the level of 
investment. Appointing such a regulator would ensure objectivity, 
 
 242. Id. (discussing why intellectual property asset valuation is more uncertain than real or personal 
property valuation). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. (acknowledging that intellectual property markets have not been established yet). 
 245. Id. at 80–81 (explaining why intellectual property assets are difficult to compare). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1175 (acknowledging the difficulty of establishing the 
value of a patent). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (discussing the centrality of the public domain for 
the production of culture and knowledge and the effects of copyright and patent policy on the public 
domain). 
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predictability, stability, and proficiency in applying the proposed scheme.250 It 
would also protect against price manipulations by those possessing strong 
bargaining power because it provides full disclosure of information pertaining 
to the cost of developing the underlying invention. 
The most suitable body to implement the proposed model is the USPTO. 
Under the proposed model, valuation is conducted upon approval and prior to 
issuance. As the entire process of patent examination is performed at the 
USPTO, it makes sense to nominate the USPTO as the body in charge of 
performing the valuation.251 Additionally, because the USPTO is the 
governmental body responsible for examining patent applications according to 
the statutory requirements for patentability, it is optimally situated to execute 
the task of investment assessment, using eligible valuation agencies. Such 
assessment would be managed through a new special division of the USPTO. 
Several existing valuation agencies can perform the process of patent 
valuation required in the proposed model.252 The USPTO may elect a few 
agencies that will conduct valuations under its auspices. Applicants will have to 
elect a qualified agency working with the USPTO to conduct the valuation and 
will bear the costs of valuation. The patentee will provide the agency with 
information required for valuation, as well as providing her own valuation if 
interested. The process of assessing the investment of the patent will essentially 
resemble the process of determining patentability: the patent applicant will be 
required to submit, in addition to her application and required fees, all relevant 
evidence that may assist the agency in determining patent investment. After 
the valuation is completed, the patent will be issued, and its duration will be 
determined based on the estimated time needed for recouping the investment. 
The patent owner will then have thirty days to contest this valuation and submit 
her opposition, paying an additional fee processing this challenge. Within this 
period of time, the patent will remain valid. A board of appeals that consists of 
valuation agency members will review the opposition and issue a final patent 
valuation. This board’s determination will be final. It should be noted that the 
determination of investment is subject to updating, as detailed above, because 
most patents are filed early in the life of an invention before significant 
investment is incurred.253 
 
 250. See Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through 
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 469–70 (2007) (noting that a 
consistent regulatory system will provide for stability). 
 251. See Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent 
Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 134–35 (2006) (describing the resources available to the USPTO). 
 252. See, e.g., Forbes Top 25 Intellectual Property Valuation Firms, CONSOR.COM (Aug. 7, 2017), 
http://consor.com/forbes-top-25-intellectual-property-valuation-service-firms/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R85P-YEN2]. 
 253. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 140, at 68–70, 72–81. 
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Establishing the recommended special division may impose additional 
administrative costs on the patent system generally and on patent applicants 
specifically.254 Indeed, pursuant to the above proposal, additional costs will be 
introduced into the patent prosecution process. These additional administrative 
costs would be financed either by patent applicants through elevated patent 
application fees or by the general public through taxation.255 Note, however, 
that in the long term these heightened administrative costs will ultimately be 
mitigated due to the prospective decrease in low-quality patent applications.256 
Indeed, since the proposed model aims to create a direct linkage between patent 
protection and patent investment, it would decrease the incentive to file low-
investment patent applications, while increasing the incentive to file high-
investment ones.257 Assuming it is generally costlier and harder to develop high-
quality inventions than low-quality ones, the number of patent applications 
should eventually decrease.258 Such a prospective decrease in the number of 
overall patent applications should, in turn, reduce the volume of human capital 
necessary to administer the examination process.259 Conceivably then, the initial 
increase in administrative costs should only be temporary260 and tolerable, 
especially if a substantial improvement in patent quality follows.261 In any event, 
the fact that prosecution costs may increase should not deter the filings of 
patents—not even filings by independent inventors and small businesses—as 
payment could be postponed until the patentee begins to profit from her 
invention. 
 
 254. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PATENT PUBLIC 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 16 (Nov. 30, 2007), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/ 
offices/com/advisory/reports/ppac_2007annualrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6JS-EPH2]. 
 255. It is important to note that since 1990 the USPTO has been fully fee-funded as a result of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1389–91. 
This means fees collected from patentees currently cover the full operational needs of the USPTO. 
GLENN J. MCLOUGHLIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20906, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 1 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RS20906.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD65-5LB9]. 
 256. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: SETTING 
AND ADJUSTING PATENT FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 10 OF THE LEAHY-SMITH 
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 95 (Jan. 18, 2013) (suggesting that an increase in patent application fees could 
reduce the number of patent applications). 
 257. See id. (analyzing the benefits of increased patent application fees). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 15 (concluding that an increase in the number of patent applications that are filed 
will necessarily bring about higher USPTO expenses on salaries and human capital). 
 260. See id. at 5 (suggesting a “three-month patent operating reserve” to support sustainable 
funding). 
 261. See id. at 95 (acknowledging that potential costs to society will bring about reduced innovation 
and inefficient research and development). 
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III.  BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF THE MODEL 
This part discusses the benefits of the proposed model and offers responses 
for some possible counterarguments. Overall, even though the proposed regime 
introduces some costs, these costs are worthwhile considering the current crisis 
in the patent system and the urgent need to improve its function. 
A. Benefits 
Our proposed recoupment patent system promotes a few objectives: 
improving patent quality, enhancing patent commercialization, preventing 
abusive acts of price manipulation, mitigating the problem of deadweight loss, 
attenuating the effects of anticommons and patent thickets phenomena, 
reducing litigation costs, and bringing the system closer to a system of prizes 
and rewards. These objectives are discussed in greater detail below. First, our 
proposal will improve overall patent quality. Bolstering the correlation between 
patent investment and patent protection through the proposed system would 
incentivize high-quality innovation while suppressing exclusivity over low-
quality innovation. Moreover, the proposed system introduces an additional 
screening mechanism for inventions above and beyond their current 
examination for patentability. Such a system may disincentivize or minimize 
the effects of defensive and cross-licensing patenting, incentivizing in their 
place the filing of patents that allow immediate recoupment, usually inventions 
that are commercialized. 
Second, the proposed system will enhance patent commercialization, 
breaking the business model of NPEs and patent trolls. Specifically, under the 
proposed model, holding noncommercialized patents for licensing and litigation 
purposes will become unprofitable and actually impossible from the moment 
the patentee recoups her investment. Recall that the level of investment is 
adjustable during the lifetime of the patent, and this should encourage 
investment in commercialization, which exceeds patent protection, over 
licensing and litigation, which add nothing to the investment, and therefore 
effectively shortens patent protection. Since the proposed system matches 
patent holders’ ability to extract licensing fees and earn litigation fees with the 
level of investment in the patent, keeping patents noncommercialized will keep 
their overall investment level—and consequently the potential fees they could 
generate—low.262 
Third, a recoupment patent scheme will prevent abusive acts of price 
manipulation. By creating limitations on the recoupment to which a patentee is 
eligible, the proposed method can stop patent owners from obtaining more 
licensing revenue than the investment in the process of invention justifies. 
 
 262. See supra Part I. 
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Once information regarding patent investment is publicly disclosed, it will 
affect licensors’ ability to extract excessive royalties. 
Fourth, and closely related, the proposed regime will mitigate the problem 
of deadweight loss associated with patent monopolies. Since low-investment 
patents will only entitle patentees to short-duration protection, patentees will 
only be able to sell such patents for a low price, thereby limiting the costs society 
has to pay for these inventions. 
Fifth, such a regime will attenuate the effects of both the anticommons 
phenomenon and patent thickets. Unlike the one-size-fits-all regime, under a 
recoupment patent regime, the ability of patentees to extract excessive royalties 
and hold out will be significantly reduced, and, as a result, the effects of 
anticommons tragedies or patent thickets will be very limited. To illustrate this, 
consider again the situation in which several patentees hold patent rights on 
different components that are necessary inputs for the production of a single 
product. Under a recoupment regime, these patentees will have limited power 
to hold out and extort rents from the producer, as they typically will not be 
entitled to a twenty-year period of protection for a patent that only reflects a 
small investment. 
Sixth, this proposal will reduce litigation and related costs because it limits 
patent damages, linking them to the investment in the development of the 
invention. This in turn will bring about greater certainty and clarity regarding 
patent validity and, as a result, will reduce both the rates and costs of litigation. 
Finally, the proposed model brings the patent system closer to a system of 
prizes and rewards. By tailoring protection according to the investment in the 
development of the invention, we essentially assign greater value to high-
investment inventions and lesser value to low-investment inventions, thus 
operating in a way that resembles the way prizes and rewards would operate. 
While this does not provide the full advantages of prizes and rewards, such as 
the lack of the invention’s exclusivity, our system nevertheless offers benefits 
that do not exist under regimes of prizes and rewards, such as avoiding the 
financial burden on the state that prizes and rewards would entail and affording 
a more egalitarian system for rewarding innovation. 
B. Challenges 
Many potential challenges to the proposed model must be addressed. 
First, unlike the relatively low administrative costs of the one-size-fits-all 
model,263 our tailored model may entail higher administrative costs of two 
types: high costs for licensing negotiations and costs stemming from patentee 
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attempts to manipulate the system.264 As Louis Kaplow suggested, rewarding a 
more valuable invention with stronger protection can entail high administrative 
costs.265 Specifically, some scholars contend that the more uniform the scope of 
the patent protection, the less costly the process of negotiating, drafting, and 
policing licensing agreements.266 Conversely, when patent rights are specific to 
the invention, the negotiating parties must be more precise in defining the 
scope of the license. Additionally, a single standard of patent protection also 
spares the litigation costs of third parties who seek to challenge the boundaries 
of protection.267 As Bell and Parchomovsky put it, variations in patent 
protection mean that “[c]ourts will have to expend efforts after the fact to 
determine the boundaries of the different rights, and legislators will have to do 
the same ex ante. Together, these efforts can impose substantial costs on 
society.”268 Additionally, the investment recoupment regime may introduce 
costs pertaining to manipulation of the system, such as attempts by patentees 
to game the system with their investment, reporting higher investment costs 
for their inventions. The problem can be even more significant in large and 
global corporations, which can distribute costs between different jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, in the long term, any increase in the costs of administering 
our proposed invention-tailored protection should be mitigated by an overall 
decrease both in the filing of extremely low-value patents and in the assertion 
of such patents against competitors.269 As we have shown above, the one-size-
fits-all system entails many challenges and costs, and it is generally agreed that 
the current system is inherently unfair. The current system is considered unfair 
in that it distorts incentives for innovation and, in the end, does not 
appropriately reward high-value and high-investment innovation. Many of the 
problems created by the existing system cannot be priced economically, but 
their negative impact on innovation is immense.270 Moreover, many of the 
concerns raised may be addressed by the safeguards we have introduced, such 
as filing and renewal fees, reporting duties, etc. Additionally, manipulation by 
global corporations may be avoided by introducing uniform international 
reporting standards and information sharing between national patent offices, 
which have been effective in other contexts, such as international taxation of 
global corporations. Accordingly, while a tailored system is arguably more time 
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consuming and introduces higher costs of examination and evaluation, we 
believe these costs are not excessive given the advantages and the cost-savings 
the system introduces. 
Second, and more specifically, our proposed system may introduce high 
costs for inventors in documenting investments and valuation, as well as higher 
filing and renewal fees. This new system may raise litigation and licensing costs 
if inventors have to establish their investment as a precondition to licensing or 
for establishing damages during litigation. An investment-based regime may 
plausibly require separate documentation for each and every invention, 
requiring the inventor to separate the costs introduced by each project and 
attributing costs to each project when there are costs that pertain to multiple 
projects. Inventors, however, especially corporate inventors, who file for and 
are issued the majority of patents,271 usually document their activities anyway, 
regardless of the patent regime in place. Such documentation is usually done to 
establish priority and credit for the invention. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
the proposed regime will introduce prohibitively high costs. 
Third, another popular argument in support of a one-size-fits-all approach 
is that it reduces information costs.272 “The more variance there is, the greater 
the informational burden with which the public must contend.”273 Since patent 
rights apply against everyone, allowing private players to determine the scope 
of their rights independently allegedly raises information costs for third parties. 
Nonetheless, as we demonstrate, there are ways to overcome information 
deficiencies in investment-tailored regimes of patent protection, especially by 
subjecting patentees to transparent declaration requirements, under which they 
must provide periodic statements of their earnings, and also by imposing on 
patentees the burden of proving their statements of incurred costs during 
licensing and litigation.274 
Fourth, it may be argued that the USPTO is not the right agency to 
administer and enforce the proposed patent system effectively. The USPTO is 
arguably not equipped to estimate patent value; the examiners are overworked 
and spend very little time evaluating applications.275 They also lack policy 
experience and, as a result, would face the kind of public choice problems with 
which Congress might be better positioned to grapple.276 Therefore, it might be 
argued that it is unlikely that the USPTO can master such a recoupment regime. 
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While such arguments are convincing with regards to the system described by 
scholars such as Lemley and Burk,277 they are less convincing regarding our 
proposed model. Our model relies more on applicant filings and reporting as 
well as external agencies’ objective valuations and less on the USPTO’s actual 
involvement or public choice assessment. 
IV.  THE RECOUPMENT MODEL AND ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS 
Several scholars have recently highlighted the crisis in the patent system 
and advanced their own proposals for reform.278 Such writers contend that 
according all inventions the same monopolistic protection irrespective of their 
inherent differences results in society paying too high a price for innovation 
and more monopoly losses than are strictly necessary to incentivize 
innovation.279 While we support this contention, we believe our proposal does 
a better job at addressing the inefficient asymmetry between the nature of a 
given invention and the type of protection it receives. 
Bell and Parchomovsky introduced a prominent criticism of the efficacy 
of the current, one-size-fits-all patent system. They proposed replacing the 
current general regime of patent protection with one that allows patentees to 
choose the level of protection from a menu of options, with varying degrees of 
protection terms, scopes, and remedies.280 Accordingly, patentees whose 
inventions portend a rather short commercial life would be able to purchase a 
shorter term of protection and perhaps waive their right to injunctive relief, 
while paying a relatively low price for their patents.281 Such a “[v]oluntary 
relinquishment of protection, either in terms of time or scope, would result in 
social net gain by reducing the deadweight loss associated with patent 
protection.”282 Importantly, the scheme proposed by Bell and Parchomovsky 
differentiates legal protection entirely based on the choice of the patentee. 
Unlike our proposal, Bell and Parchomovsky’s offers no connection between the 
duration of protection and the objective investment or value of the patent. 
Unsurprisingly, it is this absolute freedom to choose the desired length 
and scope of protection, which Bell and Parchomovsky afford patentees and 
view as one of the major advantages of their proposal, that actually constitutes 
the model’s main drawback. Without any objective guidelines or external 
review, a nonregulated, self-tailored regime of patent protection can easily miss 
its goals. First, patentees may choose to pay less for a shorter term of protection 
and perhaps even give up their right to injunctive relief but demand royalties 
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far in excess of what they would have demanded were they automatically 
granted the original patent duration of twenty years. This might be done in 
order to maximize patentee profits during this shortened period of patent 
protection. In such instances, Bell and Parchomovsky’s model would effectively 
increase rather than reduce the deadweight loss that patent protection inflicts 
on society. 
Second, and much more important, for powerful patent holders and 
especially patent trolls, the need to pay more for broader protection may not be 
sufficiently threatening. With enormous potential gains from patent 
monetization, patentees may uniformly find it worthwhile to elect the highest 
rate possible in order to receive the maximum patent protection available. 
Patent trolls will thereby purchase high patent protection and then use it to 
litigate aggressively, as they do now. In fact, because Bell and Parchomovsky’s 
model is expected to cost them more for the same scope and length of protection 
that they would have received under today’s one-size-fits-all system, it is 
reasonable to assume that strategic players will pass this increase in expenses on 
to users by raising their rent-seeking monetary demands. To compensate for 
the increased price of patent protection, patentees would increase their demands 
for royalties during licensing negotiations and intensify their litigation threats. 
In contrast to Bell and Parchomovsky’s objective, this sort of strategic behavior 
would raise the price of patents and their respective litigation costs, while 
diminishing instead of enhancing social welfare. This objection seems to us 
sufficient to reject Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal. 
Third, Bell and Parchomovsky’s self-tailored regime may favor 
experienced, powerful patentees over small, independent inventors. The 
relatively high price of broader patent protection may discourage small and 
independent inventors from engaging in research and development in the first 
place. For such inventors, agreeing to a reduced patent duration or a narrower 
scope of protection could frustrate their ability to recoup their initial investment 
costs. These inventors would be consequently discouraged from engaging in any 
inventive activity in the first place. Hence, it may turn out that a self-tailored 
regime, under which patentees are free to pay for extended patent protection 
without any external oversight, would effectively impair the position of small 
inventors without having any meaningful effect on big corporations, which have 
the financial ability to pay whatever it takes to perfect their protection. 
Our proposed model succeeds where Bell and Parchomovsky’s model 
collapses. Specifically, our investment-tailored system not only differentiates 
between different types of inventions, correlating between patent investment 
and patent duration, but also promotes external screening. It introduces a 
crucial component of objectivity that is currently missing from alternative 
proposals for invention-tailored protection. This element of objectivity means 
that patent trolls will not have the option, available to them under Bell and 
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Parchomovsky’s regime, to pay high fees for strong patent protection over low-
quality inventions. Under our model, patent investment will be determined 
objectively, based on formal estimates of external professionals that are accepted 
by the USPTO. Additionally, the model will apply several safeguards to ensure 
patentees do not overstate their costs. First, the proposed model will make filing 
and renewal fees dependent on declared patentee investment. The higher the 
costs of investment associated with a specific invention, the higher the attached 
filing and renewal fees. Second, during licensing and litigation, patentees will 
bear the burden of proof that they actually accrued their declared costs. These 
two mechanisms will discourage patentees from providing excessive 
declarations of invention costs. 
Our proposed combination of external patent valuations with internal 
safeguards ensures that the investment model will not favor larger, more 
experienced corporations over small, independent inventors. Even though the 
latter might have limited resources for investment in innovation, they can 
search for external investors who can support their project all the way through 
the filing of a patent. Moreover, our model will be able to reduce deadweight 
loss from patent protection effectively, as our model is anticipated to not only 
shorten the duration of invaluable patents but, even more importantly, limit 
their prospective profits. Patentees who file valueless inventions will not be able 
to earn more than what external valuation models will allow them to earn. At 
the same time, inventors who invested very little resources in developing their 
claimed inventions will also be restricted from inflicting excessive monopoly 
prices on users. Such meaningful limitations over the future financial gains of 
worthless patents will result in a direct increase in social welfare: it will spare 
the excessive costs of low-value patents that cannot be justified by the 
underlying invention’s technological contribution. 
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley present a different proposal for a technology-
specific system of patent protection,283 as part of the growing literature 
advocating technology-specific patent law to generate patent reforms.284 Burk 
 
 283. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (describing recent trends of increasing divergence between the ways patent law 
rules are applied in different industries). 
 284. E.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 97; Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: 
Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1406–07 (2011); Michael J. 
Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1761–62 (2011); Daniel R. Cahoy, An 
Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 635–36 (2006); 
Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. 
L. REV. 845, 847–49 (2006); Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 290–93, 297–300 (2006); Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent 
Terms and the Commercial Capacity of Innovation, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 373, 407 (2010); Jonathan 
S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 321–26; Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming 
the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 495, 508 (2007); Peter S. Menell & 
Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 50 (2013); Joshua D. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020) 
526 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
and Lemley suggest that courts subject different technological fields of 
invention and industries to different patent doctrines.285 Using the software and 
biotechnology industries to demonstrate this concept, Burk and Lemley argue 
that the application of the legal standard of the “person having ordinary skill in 
the art” can lead to totally different results regarding validity and scope in 
diverse industries.286 Therefore, they claim that it is important to ensure that 
the wide variety of different legal rules is exploited optimally in different 
technological contexts.287 
While we agree with Burk and Lemley’s observations regarding the way 
courts handle patent cases in different technological fields and agree that 
different technological fields of invention share many common characteristics, 
we do not believe that inventions within a specific industry are necessarily 
similarly valuable. We take a more fine-grained approach that distinguishes 
between patents within industries. For example, a specific invention within the 
computer science industry can be a pioneering one, having an extremely high 
anticipated value, while a different computer science invention may be close to 
worthless. Granting both inventions equal protection imposes an excessive 
burden on society: the social benefit of the later invention is outweighed by the 
costs it imposes on competitors and the general public. As a result, society 
overpays for the provision of a low-value patent. Additionally, because both 
inventions are expected to confer similar benefits on their owners, future 
inventors would be encouraged to invest their talent and resources in the least 
expensive and complicated projects, further diminishing social welfare. On the 
other hand, inventions in totally different industries may have similar economic 
value or may otherwise inflict similar costs of invention on inventors. Such 
inventions should merit similar patent protection, even though they pertain to 
different technological fields. 
Furthermore, under Burk and Lemley’s model, patentees will likely try to 
game the system and draft their purported invention to appear pertinent to a 
technological field that affords better patent protection.288 This is precisely what 
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happened in the fields of software and business method patents.289 Because 
technology-specific regimes entail no means to guarantee the cooperation of 
patentees, they are very likely to become extremely burdensome on judges, who 
would struggle to classify the industry to which a given invention belongs. 
Sophisticated and experienced patentees are expected to use confusing claim 
drafting to receive favorable treatment, making the process of claim 
construction even more encumbered and time consuming than it already is.290 
A technology-tailored system of patent protection also suffers from several 
practical implementation barriers. First, the boundaries between technologies 
are highly ambiguous and mutable.291 In fact, many inventions simultaneously 
fall within multiple distinct technological categories.292 Second, technological 
and market conditions evolve rapidly, further complicating the task of designing 
and implementing technology-specific patent laws that keep pace with these 
changes.293 Additionally, and no less importantly, we still lack a clear and 
coherent analysis of how patent protection affects progress and innovation in 
different industries. Therefore, it appears that the time is not ripe for tailoring 
patent awards according to technological characteristics.294 Indeed, 
technological differentiation is significantly more involved than merely 
dividing between pharmaceutical and software patents. There are over 260,000 
distinct categories of technology recognized by the USPTO.295 It is highly 
doubtful that these could ever be ranked properly according to their need for 
protection based solely on their technological characteristics.296 Note, however, 
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that we do not challenge the practice common in courts to take into account the 
technological field of the invention while applying different patent doctrines.297 
Our patent model clearly correlates investment and patent protection on 
a case-by-case basis. Hence, it is much less likely to err in determining the 
appropriate scope of patent protection. Every invention will be examined and 
evaluated independently, regardless of the industry to which it supposedly 
belongs. Such a high degree of individualization in defining the duration of 
patent protection will ensure patentees do not receive more than they deserve 
for their specific contributions. This will subsequently guarantee that society 
does not overpay for worthless inventions. In addition, our model encourages 
the cooperation of patentees with the USPTO in three important ways. First, 
it requires all patentees to submit a periodic statement of earnings to allow both 
the USPTO and third parties to estimate the remaining patent duration.298 
Second, under our proposed model, filing and maintenance fees are derived 
from the patentee’s declared investment costs; therefore, any exaggeration from 
the side of the patentee will be reflected in the fees she will subsequently owe 
the USPTO. Third, in our model, patentees bear the burden of proving the 
declared costs of their invention during licensing and litigation. As such, any 
misstatement from the patentee will increase her litigation costs and possible 
responsibilities for damages. 
A related, but more advanced, proposal for a tailored system of patent 
awards has been advanced by Benjamin Roin.299 Noting that “[c]ertain types of 
inventions take much longer to develop than others, and a lengthier time-to-
market strongly correlates with an increased need for patent protection and a 
lower risk that patents will stifle subsequent innovation,”300 Roin suggests 
differentiating between protections granted to patents in accordance with the 
inventions’ time-to-market. This factor is arguably capable of matching the 
need for protection with the risk of patents stifling subsequent innovation.301 
Roin defines inventions’ “time-to-market” as the “time it takes to move from 
the initial idea to its first sale as a commercialized product,”302 suggesting that 
this factor is an observable proxy for optimal, technology-based patent strength. 
At the crux of Roin’s proposal stands the proposition that “inventions’ time-to-
market strongly correlates with optimal patent strength.”303 Yet, it is possible to 
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think of instances where worthless inventions take longer to mature into 
marketable goods.304 
According to Roin, the optimal patent award for inventions is primarily a 
function of their R&D costs, the risk of failure in R&D, the anticipated future 
revenue streams from the projects if they succeed, and the potential for 
imitation by rivals.305 Roin further argues that an invention’s time-to-market is 
a reliable indicator for all these factors.306 Yet, while longer time-to-market is 
probably a reliable indicator of higher commercialization costs, we are not sure 
to what extent it adequately reflects the inventor’s incurred costs of invention. 
An inventor does not need to provide proof of actual sales in order to secure a 
patent.307 This means that her initial costs of invention may reflect only a small 
portion of her ultimate commercialization costs, which Roin generally, but with 
slight imprecision, describes as R&D costs.308 Moreover, according to Roin, 
“Inventions that generate lower annual sales revenues likely need stronger 
protection to be profitable, since it takes more time for the invention to produce 
enough revenue for the firm to recover its R&D costs.”309 However, extended 
time-to-market is obviously not the sole reason for low sales revenue. The 
economic value of the invention, its prospective market, the invention’s 
technological contribution, and effective consumer demand are no less, if not 
more, important in determining the prospective annual earnings of a given 
patent. 
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that affording stronger patent 
protection to inventions that take longer to reach the market is a socially 
desirable policy lever. Strengthening patent protection inevitably results in 
enhanced access barriers, which subsequently stifle innovation.310 Consumers 
bear the increased deadweight loss of stronger patents, and subsequent 
inventors are impeded from improving and advancing the strongly protected 
invention.311 Arguably, providing stronger protection to patents having longer 
time-to-market is not the optimal way of incentivizing their provisions. 
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An additional reform proposal suggests instituting prizes and rewards in 
lieu of patent protection. The rich literature concerning patent prizes includes 
various suggestions on how an agency should determine, ex ante, the value of 
the prize to be awarded to the inventor for the development of her invention as 
an alternative mechanism to the exclusive rights granted by patents.312 These 
valuation methods are ex ante in the sense that they are applied before the 
invention turns into a desired commercial product, which is also the case for 
many patents that are filed very early in the life of inventions. For example, 
Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele described a prize system that 
inventors could opt into instead of the patent system.313 Similarly, Michael 
Kremer has described a system in which patent recipients would agree to give 
up their patents in exchange for compensation that would be determined 
through a unique auction process.314 Doug Lichtman has suggested that the 
government could achieve the benefits of a prize system with much lower costs 
by keeping the patent system and subsidizing consumers who would value 
patented products above marginal cost but could not afford them at the 
monopoly price.315 Michael Abramowicz’s proposal goes in a different direction 
and suggests that a claimant will receive her prize at a later point in time when 
the true commercial potential of her invention is known.316 
These different ex ante reward systems provide inventors with prizes 
instead of exclusive rights, and as such, they are outside the realm of patent 
licensing. This ex ante valuation approach fits with our model, which also seeks 
to reward inventors for their efforts but keeps a patent-based scheme. Prizes are 
desirable for many reasons; however, our regime is superior to prizes in that it 
awards tailored patent protection, which is sponsored by the market rather than 
the state. 
Lastly, Maayan Perel has also proposed a novel, ex ante method of patent 
valuation for licensing purposes.317 Very much like the proposal in this Article, 
she suggests that the value of patents should correlate with their technological 
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contribution to adequately reward innovation. Her proposed method deviates 
from existing methods in at least four aspects.318 First, it adopts a social-
normative perspective instead of a positive economic one. It essentially asks 
what should be the license value, from the standpoint of the patent system and 
not what that value would be in a world with no regulatory intervention. 
Second, it is performed ex ante, upon the grant of patent protection, long before 
any licensing negotiations are initiated. Third, it recommends flexible 
limitations on the ultimate license value rather than setting a single, fixed price. 
Fourth, it suggests subjecting the process of patent valuation to external 
regulation instead of leaving it to the exclusive control of free market powers. 
Perel advances a two-step, novel method of patent valuation, determining the 
quality of a given patent according to proposed quality indicators and then 
assigning flexible price limitations that correlate with such quality. Such a 
method would promote four objectives.319 First, translating patent quality into 
a numerical patent value would encourage high-quality innovation and improve 
patent quality. Second, setting ex ante limitations on the licensing price the 
patentee may ultimately demand would downgrade patent trolling. Third, 
determining the price of a patent upon issuance would neutralize the 
manipulative effect of external factors, such as the identity of negotiating 
parties and their respective bargaining powers, as well as the circumstances 
surrounding licensing negotiations. As a result, such a model could hamper 
patentees’ ability to hold up subsequent innovation and impede future research. 
Fourth, in the long term, this method would also reduce litigation costs and 
litigation rates for the benefit of the public as a whole. We share many of the 
underlying assumptions of Perel’s article regarding the desirability of an ex ante 
approach to patent valuation. However, her article is limited to licensing. Here, 
we present comprehensive proposals pertaining to the patent system as a whole. 
As such, Perel’s proposal is of limited value for our purposes. 
Our proposed system is the only proposal to tie patent protection directly 
to patent investment, recognizing the crucial role of investment for the aims of 
patent law and policy. Other reform proposals either ignore investment or are 
based on proxies for investment and therefore offer less accurate results. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a novel model for patent protection designed to 
overcome the epidemic of low-quality patents and the crisis it is currently 
creating. It introduces the recoupment patent system, with its significant 
safeguards, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages, and suggests that, if 
we want to follow the wording and spirit of the constitutional mandate to 
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incentivize innovation, we should aspire to have higher patent quality. This 
differentiated, invention-specific regime should be carefully designed in order 
to achieve its ambitious goals. The proposed scheme is the right step in this 
direction. The Article also explores alternative schemes that have been proposed 
over the years as a way to either improve or replace the system, pointing to their 
strengths and weaknesses. Our proposed framework offers differentiated length 
of patent protection, tailored according to patent investment. We demonstrate 
that this mechanism fits well with the dictates of patent theory and with the 
goals of the patent system, and adequately addresses the current patent crisis. 
This promising system can also be applied in other fields of intellectual 
property law: mainly copyright law, trade secrecy, database law, and design law. 
It offers a thoughtful way to afford incentives while not compromising 
downstream innovation. However, the extension of our proposed model to 
other fields of intellectual property should be the subject of other research 
projects. 
